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New financial intermediary development indicators for developing 
countries
Abstract 
Financial development indicators are often applied to countries/regions without taking 
into account  specific  financial  development realities.  Financial  depth in the perspective of 
monetary base is  not equal  to liquid liabilities  in every development  context.   This paper 
introduces  complementary indicators  to  the  existing Financial  Development  and Structure 
Database (FDSD) and unites two streams of research. It contributes at the same time to the 
macroeconomic literature on measuring financial development and responds to the growing 
field  of  economic  development  by  means  of  informal  financial  sector  promotion  and 
microfinance. The paper suggests a practicable way to disentangle the effects of the various 
financial sectors on economic developments.
JEL Classification: E00; E26
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1. Motivation
Financial  development indicators have been universally applied without taking into 
account regional/country specific financial development needs and realities. Usage of some 
indicators for instance is based on the presumption that they are generally valid (Gries et al., 
2009)1; not withstanding empirical evidence that not all indicators may matter in financial 
development (Asongu, 2010a).  Furthermore, the absence of a consensus on the superiority of 
financial development indicators; especially the widely used proxy for financial depth (Gries 
et al., 2009) is desirous of research attention.   As far as we have perused related literature, we 
suppose that the absence of any study that focuses on the quality of financial development 
indicators with respect to contextual development concerns is enough inspiration to search for 
the missing link. It is therefore our objective in this paper to verify the validity of the financial 
depth indicator as applied to developing countries and hence decompose it to new measures 
that best address financial development challenges in developing countries. The underlying 
impetus of our study is the misleading assumption that liquid liabilities can be proxied by the 
monetary base (financial depth) in developing countries.  This paper will therefore suggest a 
practicable  way  to  disentangle  the  effects  of  the  various  financial  sectors  on  economic 
developments.  We  shall  develop  testable  hypotheses  and  propositions  for  more  refined 
financial development indicators and empirically verify their validity in the finance-growth 
nexus. GDP and Monetary-base oriented ratios are developed for each sector of the financial 
system. Our conception of the financial system goes beyond the realm of that expressed in the 
International  Financial  Statistics’  definition;  it  integrates  the  informal  sector,  hitherto  a 
missing component in the existing measurement of the monetary base (M2). 
Specific contributions of this paper to finance-growth literature include testing if: (1) 
the informal financial sector significantly contributes to economic growth; (2) disentangling 
1 Gries et al. (2003) state: “In the related literature several proxies for financial deepening have been suggested,  
for example, monetary aggregates such as M2 on GDP. To date there is no consensus on the on the superiority of  
any indicator” (page 1851). 
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different components of the existing measurement could influence policy decisions and; (3) 
introducing  measures  of  sector  importance  to  complement  GDP  ratio  indicators  could 
ameliorate understanding of the finance-growth nexus. 
Our study could be interesting to policy makers and researchers because it unites two 
streams  of  research.  It  contributes  at  the  same  time  to  the  macroeconomic  literature  on 
measuring financial development and responds to the growing field of economic development 
by means of informal  financial  sector promotion and microfinance.  The absence of sound 
fundamentals in a financial indicator might bias estimations and result in unhealthy policy 
recommendations. The rest of the paper is structured in the following manner:  section two 
examines  related  literature  and  resulting  hypotheses;  new  indicators  based  on  testable 
hypotheses are proposed in section three; data and methodology are presented and outlined 
respectively in section four; section five focuses on empirical analysis; we conclude in section 
six. 
2. Related Literature
 2.1 Monetary base as a biased indicator of liquid liabilities in developing countries
2.1.1 Definition of key-terms
a)  Monetary Base
This is the amount of money in an economy.  This is the measure of the money supply 
that typically includes most liquid currencies. Measures of money are classified as level of M, 
with the monetary base (M0) being the smallest and lowest M-level. While base money can 
be described as the most acceptable liquid form of final payment, a broad measures of money 
supply (M1) includes  demand deposits  to  M0.  Less  liquid  savings  accounts  such as time 
deposits  add  up  to  M1  to  define  a  broader  money  supply  (M2).  Large  time  deposits,  
institutional money market funds, other larger liquid assets and short-term repurchase in turn 
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sum up to M2 to constitute the broadest money supply (M3). With respect to the context of 
our paper M2 is more appropriate due to relative undeveloped financial sector of developing 
countries.  In  the less  developed world M0 could be  assimilated  to  the informal  financial 
sector, implying the monetary base (M0) for the most part entails informal finance. As earlier 
outlined, when formal and semi-formal banking sector deposits are integrated to M0 then a 
broad money supply definition (M2) is obtained.  Liquid liabilities should therefore be the 
component of M2 circulating within the banking system (M2-M0). 
b)  Liquid liabilities 
A Liquid liability is a debt or claim that has been converted into cash as it becomes 
due. In the context of  our work, it refers to bank deposits in current and savings accounts 
(M2-M0). While in developed countries liquid liabilities could be assimilated to M2 (as M0 is 
mostly held by the banking sector),  in underdeveloped countries  M0 quite often does not 
transit through the banking sector and thus by definition is not a bank liability. 
c)  Financial system by International Financial Statistics (IFS)
 According to the IFS,  the financial system consists of deposit money banks (formal 
banking sector) and other financial institutions (semi-formal banking sector)2. This definition 
is ideal for developed countries (where M0 is part of the banking sector) but lacking in some 
substance in the underdeveloped world (where most  holders  of liquidity contained in M0 
don’t  have  bank accounts).  Therefore  according  to  this  definition,  financial  depth  is  M2 
without informal finance.   
Within the framework of this paper financial depth corresponds to M2 (including the 
informal financial sector) 
2 See lines 24, 25 and 45 of IFS, October 2008.
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2.1.2 Theoretical basis
Liquid  liabilities  expressed  in  terms  of  monetary  base  are  without  distinction  of 
financial  sectors  and rest  on  the  assumption  that  almost  all  currency held  is  linked  to  a 
financial  sector  deposit.  Beck  et  al.,  (1999)  on  presenting  a  new  database  on  financial 
development and structure pointed-out: “Since many researchers have focused on the liability  
side of the balance sheet, we include a measure of absolute size based on liabilities. Liquid  
liabilities to GDP equal currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and  
other financial intermediaries divided by GDP. This is the broadest available indicator of  
financial  intermediation,  since it  includes all  three financial  sectors....Liquid liability  is  a  
typical measure of financial depth  and thus the overall size of the financial sector without  
distinguishing  between  financial  sectors  of  the  use  of  liabilities”(page  11).  It  is  worth 
emphasizing  that  almost  no distinction  is  made between different  financial  sectors  in  the 
FDSD; and the hypothesis of all constituents of the monetary base linked to the liability side 
of the balance sheet is questionable for developing countries. Almost all currency held for 
transaction  motives  in  developed  countries  are  still  recycled  in  banks3.  However,  this  is 
subject to controversy in the underdeveloped world and therefore distinction between formal, 
semi-formal and informal banking sectors is imperative. 
A bias  in  the definition  of  financial  system deposits  (aka liquid  liabilities)  by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) is deserving of examination. According to International 
Financial  Statistics  (hence IFS),  the financial  system is made up of the formal  and semi-
formal sectors; that is deposit money banks and other financial institutions (see lines 24, 25 
and  45  of  IFS,  October  2008).  While  this  definition  could  be  quasi-true  for  developed 
countries,  it  fails  to  take  account  of  the  informal  financial  sector  in  developing  and 
underdeveloped countries. This leaves us with some concern over the role of the informal 
sector in financial intermediary development and growth.
3 Bank deposits are liquid liabilities. 
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2.1.3 Empirical framework
Though the monetary base (M2/GDP) which represents  the money stock has  been 
widely used as a standard measure of liquid liabilities in many studies (World Bank 1989; 
King and Levine,  1993),  in  developing countries  a large part  of the monetary base stock 
consists of currency held outside banks. As such, an improvement in the M2/GDP ratio may 
reflect an extensive use of currency rather than an increase in bank deposits. In an attempt to 
curtail  this  shortcoming,  Demetriades  and  Hussein  (1996)  suggested  the  subtraction  of 
currency outside banks from M2 in the measure of liquidity liabilities in developing countries. 
Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2008) amongst others have recently adjusted M2 in like manner. 
But these adjustments fail to point-out that the “adjusted-measure “constitutes the formal and 
semi-formal financial sectors. More so, the informal financial sector is ruled-out as marginal 
in  this  conception  of  the  finance-growth  nexus.  We  shall  endeavor  to  address  these 
insufficiencies in this paper.
Some authors have sought to address the issue by determining a broad variable that is 
indicative  of  financial  depth.  They  use  the  first  principal  component  of  M2/GDP and  a 
combination of one or more financial indicators (Khumbhakar and Mavrotas, 2005; Ang and 
McKibbin, 2007). By so doing they decrease the dimensionality of the set of variables without 
losing much information on the one hand; and on the other hand decrease problems related to 
the quality of M2 as a measure of liquid liabilities. The set-back of this approach to a solution 
is  that,  more  often  financial  depth  is  mixed  with  concepts  of  financial  activity  (private 
domestic  credit/GDP),  financial  size  (deposit  bank  assets/central  bank assets  plus  deposit 
money  assets),  financial  allocation  efficiency(bank  credit/bank  deposits)…etc.  The 
contribution of this paper to the existing literature is to address this problem without mixing-
up these financial concepts. 
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Despite the partial awareness of this challenge, literature is inundated with works on 
financial development in developing countries that do not distinguish between components in 
M2 held by banks and currency held outside of the formal financial sector. We argue that 
probing the distinction between formal, semi-formal and informal banking sectors could be 
interesting in mastering the finance-growth nexus. 
2.2 Why the concept of ‘financial-intermediary-formalization’ is crucial in economic 
development?
In  Africa  a  very  low  percentage  of  households  have  access  to  formal  financial 
services4.  The  issue  is  further  evident  with  low  population  densities,  poor  transport  and 
limited communications infrastructure;  which inhibit  formal financial  intermediation.  Even 
where  such  services  are  available,  small  and  medium  size  businesses,  and  low  income 
individuals  could  find  it  difficult  meeting-up  with  eligibility  criteria  such  as  strict 
documentation  requirements  and/or  collaterals.  Beside  constraints  of  physical  access  and 
eligibility,  cost  barriers in  the  form  of  high  transaction  fees  or  considerable  minimum 
requirements for savings-balances or loan-amounts present another stumbling block. 
2.2.1 Distinction between formal, semi-formal and informal financial intermediaries
Firstly, as could be grasped from table 1 formal  finance refers to services that are 
regulated by the central bank and other supervisory authorities. Secondly, semi-formal finance 
is a distinction between formal and informal finance. This is part of finance that occurs in a 
formal financial  environment but not formally recognized. An eloquent example is micro-
finance.  Thirdly, informal finance is one that is not arranged through formal agreements and 
not enforced through the legal system. The last two types  of saving and lending are very 
4 Making Finance work for Africa : http://www.mfw4a.org/access-to-finance/access-to-finance.html 
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common in developing countries, particularly among the financially excluded or those on low 
incomes. 
Table  1  inspired  by  Steel  (2006)  clearly  expatiates  the  role  of  semi-formal  and 
informal banks in the financial system of developing countries. Therefore, the role of Credit 
Unions  and  Micro  Finance  NGOs  (semi-formal  finance)  as  well  as  elements  of  the  last 
category cannot be undermined in the finance-led-growth nexus: such is the goal of our paper. 
Table 1: Segments of the financial system by degree of formality in Paper’s context 
Paper’s context Tiers Definitions Institutions Principal Clients
Formal 
financial 
system
IMF 
Definition 
of Financial 
System 
from 
International 
Financial 
Statistics 
(IFS)
Formal 
Financial 
sector 
(Deposit 
Banks)
Formal 
banks
Licensed by 
central bank
Commercial 
and 
development 
banks 
Large businesses, 
Government
Semi-
formal  and 
informal 
financial 
systems
Semi-formal 
financial 
sector
(Other 
Financial 
Institutions)
Specialized 
non-bank 
financial 
institutions
Rural banks, 
Post banks, 
Saving and 
Loan 
Companies, 
Deposit 
taking Micro 
Finance banks 
Large rural 
enterprises, 
Salaried Workers, 
Small and medium 
enterprises 
Other non-
bank 
financial 
institutions
Legally 
registered but 
not licensed 
as financial 
institution by 
central bank 
and 
government
Credit 
Unions, 
Micro 
Finance 
NGOs
Microenterprises, 
Entrepreneurial 
poor
Missing 
component 
in IFS 
definition
Informal 
financial 
sector
Informal 
banks
Not legally 
registered at 
national 
level(though 
may be linked 
to a registered 
association)
Savings 
collectors, 
Savings and 
credit 
associations, 
Money 
lenders
Self-employed 
poor
Source (author)
 
2.2.2  Imperative  of  decomposing  financial  depth  into  formal,  semi-formal  and  informal  
components in financial intermediary development.
Hitherto,  from a general macroeconomic perspective,  the imperative of specifically 
determining  the  role  of  semi-formal  and  informal  banks  in  financial  intermediary 
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development has been marginal. We argue that stopping short of this would be gross injustice 
to  the  two  later  categories  (see  table  1)  which  represent  quite  a  significant  bulk  of  the 
financial  sector in developing countries. The following stylized facts and hypotheses fully 
express the spirit of decomposing financial depth into essential constituents.
a) Stylized facts 
The IMF definition of the financial system is limited to the formal and semi-formal 
sectors; that is deposits money banks and other financial institutions (see lines 24, 25 and 45 
of  International  Financial  Statistics,  October  2008).  While  this  could  be  quasi  true  for 
developed  countries,  this  definition  holds  less  ground  in  developing  and  underdeveloped 
worlds where, the informal financial sector takes a toll on the financial system and plays an 
important role in economic growth and development. 
Contrary to mainstream literature, in developing countries money in circulation plus 
transaction  and  time  deposits  (M2)  is  not  equal  to  liquid  liabilities.  This  suggests  that, 
equating financial depth to liquid liabilities would be synonymous to assuming the inexistence 
and/or insignificance of the informal financial sector. Money in circulation withheld by the 
informal sector does not always transit through the banking system5. Therefore such currency 
cannot be considered as formal bank sector deposits or liquid liabilities. More so, part of the 
semi-formal financial sector made-up of other non-bank financial institutions that are legally 
registered but not licensed as financial institutions by the central bank and government (e.g 
Micro  Finance  NGO’s),  also  hold  a  substantial  part  of  M2 which  do not  transit  through 
banking sector. 
5 Less  than 20% of population in some developing countries (e.g.  Africa)  has access  to the formal banking 
system.  See:  Access  to  Finance  in  Making  Finance  work  for  Africa:  http://www.mfw4a.org/access-to-
finance/access-to-finance.html
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Besides  introducing an informal financial sector indicator for growth, disentangling 
the  existing  measure  (M2) into  its  formal  and semi-formal  constituents  in  the  context  of 
underdeveloped  countries  could  improve  our  insight  on  the  finance-growth  nexus  in  the 
growing field of financial and economic developments. 
b) Testable hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: The informal financial sector (a previously missing component in the definition 
of monetary base: M2) significantly contributes to economic growth. 
Hypothesis  2:  Disentangling  different  components  of  the  existing  measurement  (financial 
system) into formal (banking sector) and semi-formal (other financial institutions) financial 
sector indicators could improve understanding of the finance-growth nexus. 
Hypothesis  3:  Introducing measures of sector importance could ameliorate the capacity to 
understand how evolvements (improvements) of shares in different sectors of the financial 
system affect the finance-growth nexus. To put this in other terms, the need to evaluate how 
one financial sector develops at the expense of another and vice-versa could be crucial in 
orienting policy-making. 
Above hypotheses (with exclusive respect to components of M26) inspire propositions 
on “financial development indicators” and “measures of sector importance”.   
3. Propositions of new indicators 
Financial development could either be indirect (financial intermediary development- 
through the banking sector) or direct (through financial markets). The context of this study is 
limited to the former type of financial development. Borrowing from Demirgüç-Kunt (1999), 
6 Beside financial depth (M2), financial activity, size and efficiency also have financial intermediary 
development indicators which are not in the context of this paper. 
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indirect  indicators  could  further  be classified  into  financial  development  aspects  of  depth 
(M2), allocation efficiency7, activity8 and size9. Amongst these measures, financial depth is 
the most widely used in the finance-growth literature.  
3.1 Financial development indicators (M2-based)
3.1.1 Formal financial development
Proposition 1: Formal financial development could be defined as:
GDP
depositsBankop _1.Pr =
Bank deposits10  here refer to demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money banks. 
3.1.2 Semi-formal financial development
Proposition 2: Semi-formal financial development could be appreciated as:
GDP
depositsBankdepositsFinancialop __2.Pr −=
Financial deposits11 are demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions. 
3.1.3 Informal financial development 
Proposition 3: Informal financial development can be conceived as:
GDP
depositsFinancialMBaseMonetaryop _)2(_3.Pr −=
3.1.4 Informal and semi-formal financial development
Proposition 4: Informal and semi-formal financial development can be defined as:
GDP
depositsBankMBaseMonetaryop _)2(_4.Pr −=
7 Bank credit on bank deposits.
8 Private domestic credit on GDP.
9 Deposit bank assets / Central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. 
10 Lines 24 and 25 of International Financial Statistics (IFS); October 2008. 
11 Lines 24, 25 and 45 of IFS, October, 2008. 
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3.2 Measures of sector importance
3.2.1 Financial intermediary formalization 
Proposition  5:  From  ‘informal  and  semi-formal’  to  formal financial  development 
(formalization) 
)2(_
_5.Pr
MBaseMonetary
depositsBankop =
In undeveloped countries M2 is not equal to liquid liabilities (liquid liabilities equal bank 
deposits: bd). Whereas in undeveloped countries bd/M2<1, in developed countries bd/M2 is 
almost equal to 1.  This indicator measures the rate at which money in circulation is absorbed 
by the banking system. Financial formalization here is defined as the propensity of the formal 
banking system to absorb money in circulation. 
3.2.2 Financial intermediary ‘semi-formalization’
Proposition  6:  From ‘informal  and  formal’  to  semi-formal financial  development  (Semi-
formalization)
)2(_
__6.Pr
MBaseMonetary
depositsBankdepositsFinancialop −=
This indicator measures the level at which the semi-formal financial sector evolves to 
the detriment of formal and informal sectors. 
3.2.3 Financial intermediary ‘informalization’ 
Proposition  7:  From  ‘formal  and  semi-formal’  to  informal financial  development 
(Informalisation)
)2(_
_)2(_7.Pr
MBaseMonetary
depositsFinancialMBaseMonetaryop −=
This proposition shows the rate at which the informal financial sector is developing at 
the cost of formal and semi-formal sectors.
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Propositions 5, 6 and 7 add up to unity (one) arithmetically spelling-out the underlying 
assumption of sector importance. That is, when their time series properties are considered in 
empirical analysis, the evolution of one sector is to the detriment of other sectors and vice-
versa. 
3.2.4 Financial intermediary ‘semi-formalization and informalization’ 
Proposition  8:  Formal  to  ‘informal  and  semi-formal’  financial  development:  (Semi-
formalisation and informalization) 
)2(_
_)2(_8.Pr
MBaseMonetary
depositsBankMBaseMonetaryop −=
The  proposition  appreciates  the  deterioration  of  the  formal  banking  sector  to  the 
benefit of other sectors (informal and semi-formal). From common sense, proposition 5 and 8 
should be perfectly antagonistic,  meaning the former (formal financial  development at the 
expense of other sectors) and the later (formal sector deterioration) should display a perfectly 
negative coefficient of correlation12. 
3.2.5 Interaction of propositions 
Owing to the compatibility of propositions 1, 2, 3 and 4 with propositions 5, 6, 7 and 8 
respectively,  we  are  poised  to  hypothesis  that  though  the  propositions  are  independent 
significant  determinants  of  growth,  a  combination  of  them would increase  their  effect  on 
growth (more than their independent sums). That is, for instance the combined of effect of 
12 Correlation analysis in the appendix meets this expectation. 
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propositions 1 and 5(for formal finance) should be greater than the sum of independent effects 
of propositions 1 and 5. The following testable hypothesis results there-from. 
Hypothesis 4: For formal finance, simultaneous improvement of shares in GDP (Prop.1) and 
Monetary Base (Prop.5) should have a higher impact on growth (than that expressed by their 
independent  sums).  By  the  same  token,  this  applies  to  semi-formal  finance  (Prop.2  and 
Prop.6) and informal finance (Prop.3 and Prop.7). 
3.2.6 Linkages between financial development measures, financial depth and liquid liabilities 
Liquid liabilities are equal to the Monetary base (M2) or financial depth in developing 
and underdeveloped countries only when all three sectors of finance are considered. 
Therefore,   Liquid liabilities = M2;      if and only if:
3.Pr2.Pr1.Pr)2(_ opopopMsliabilitieLiquid ++=
This definition of liquidity liabilities based on propositions 1-3 differs from the usual 
definition (sum of propositions 1 and 2). Hence the empirical section of this paper will use the 
definition of liquid liabilities that comprises definitions 1-3. 
4. Data and Methodology
4.1 Data
Since this paper is methodological oriented, justification of a broad database in the 
choice of data is not much of a constraint.  African Development Indicators (ADI) of the 
World Bank and the Financial  Development and Structure Database (FDSD) are our main 
data sources. We limit ourselves to developing countries  with data on testable hypotheses; i.e. 
priority to  countries  which have data  for  both the informal  financial  sector  (M2-financial  system 
deposits) and the semi-formal sector (financial system deposits-bank system deposits).  Our panel is 
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made up of Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Morocco, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo and 
Tunisia, spanning from 1986 to 2009. Selected variables from ADI include: GDP per capita 
growth13, GDP growth14 (dependent variables), Inflation15, Trade on GDP, Population growth 
and  General  government  final  consumption  expenditure  (control  variables).  Our  control 
variables are in line with empirical literature (Levine & King, 1993; Hassan et al., 2011). 
Independent  variables  (Propositions  from section  3)  originate  from transformations  in  the 
FDSD. 
4.2 Methodology 
4.2.1 Unit root tests
Since we seek to employ a model that assumes a particular functional distribution in 
data analysis, we begin by investigating the stationary properties of our variables at level16 
and first difference17. Among existing panel unit root tests we prefer the first generation(cross 
sectional  independence)  to  the second generation(cross  sectional  dependence)  because the 
number of periods in each cross section is superior to the number to cross sections(T>N).18 
Among existing first generational tests, we opt for Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC, 2002) and Im, 
Pesaran  and  Shin  (IPS,  2003)  for  homogenous  and  heterogeneous  tests  respectively.  
Borrowing from Asongu (2011) and Khim (2004)  we specify  the  LLC and IPS tests  by 
Hannan-Quinn  Information  Criterion  (HQC)  and  Akaike  Information  Criterion  (AIC)19 
respectively. Maddala and Wu (1999) shape our decisions on integration properties in event 
13 GDP per capita growth proxy’s welfare and is growth in the average annual income per individual. 
14 GDP growth reflects the levels of economic growth. 
15 Inflation based on annual % of consumer prices.
16 I (0): stationary or absence of unit root at level series.
17 I (1): stationary at first difference or first order integration. 
18 Cross section dependence tests can only be applied when the numbers of cross sections (N) exceed the number 
of periods (T).
19 Panel observations are more than 120. With respect to Khim (2004), optimal lag selection for goodness of fit is 
best  with  AIC  or  Final  Prediction  Error  (FPE)  when  observations  are  less  than  60.  However  when  these 
observations exceed 120, the HQC is best. 
16
of a conflict of interest between LLC and IPS tests20. Table 2 shows stationary properties of 
variables in bold. 
          Table 2: Homogenous and heterogeneous panel unit root tests
Variables
Homogenous(LLC) tests Heterogeneous(IPS) tests
Level First difference Level First difference
c ct c ct c ct c ct
LL(M2) 3.55 2.55 -8.41*** -7.53*** 2.62 1.14 -7.13*** -6.61***
Prop(1) 4.41 3.74 -3.93*** -7.36*** 4.85 5.13 -4.76*** -6.19***
Prop(2) -1.55* 0.40 -4.92*** -3.46*** -0.20 1.07 -5.07*** -3.33***
Prop(3) -4.03*** -8.11*** n.a n.a -5.80*** -6.72*** n.a n.a
Prop(4) 2.26 -3.40*** -5.92*** -14.69*** -0.47 -1.84** -6.15*** -10.03***
Prop(5) 1.49 -3.24*** -5.89*** -3.83*** 2.48 -2.48*** -5.92*** -4.27***
Prop(6) -5.23*** -0.31 -3.90*** -3.13*** -3.54*** -0.27 -3.85*** -3.57***
Prop(7) -0.37 -5.12*** -6.51*** -5.32*** -0.01 -3.92*** -5.65*** -3.73***
Prop(8) 1.49 -3.24*** -5.89*** -3.83*** 2.48 -2.48*** -5.92*** -4.27***
Prop(1*5) 3.86 2.88 -4.34*** -4.60*** 4.72 3.36 -5.26*** -4.71***
Prop(2*6) -1.47* -1.01 -7.39*** -7.20*** -0.45 0.17 -7.08*** -7.12***
Prop(3*7) -0.88 -2.13** -7.00*** -5.26*** -0.91 -3.15*** -5.36*** -3.49***
Prop(4*8) 1.21 -0.51 -6.00*** -5.02*** 1.43 -1.99** -4.68*** -3.51***
Inflation -5.03*** -4.06*** n.a n.a -5.12*** -2.61*** n.a n.a
Trade -1.97** -2.29** n.a n.a -2.60*** -3.36*** n.a n.a
GDPg -8.77*** -3.67*** n.a n.a -11.68*** -6.76*** n.a n.a
GDPpcg -8.47*** -4.24*** n.a n.a -11.13*** -7.11*** n.a n.a
Popg -1.51* -2.63*** n.a n.a -2.61*** -11.82*** n.a n.a
Gov’t -1.34* 1.57 -7.31*** -5.98*** -1.30* 0.93 -7.95*** -6.41***
*, **,  *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  ‘c’ and ‘ct’: ‘constant’ and ‘constant and trend’ ;respectively.  n.a: not  
applicable. Stationary series are in bold and decision rule depends on both tests but priority is given the IPS in case of conflict of interest.  
LLC; Levin, Lin and Chu (2002). IPS: Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003). Optimal lag selection is governed by AIC and HQC for IPS and LLC  
tests  respectively.  GDPpcg:  GDP per  capita  growth.  GDPg:  GDP growth.  LL (M2):  Liquid  Liabilities  on  GDP. Infl:  Inflation.  Popg: 
Population growth. Gov’t: Government expenditure. Prop (h): Propositions. 
4.2.2 Model specification tests
Following Asongu (2010b) we opt for Generalized Least Squares (GLS) with Fixed 
Effects (FE) and do not perform the Hausman test to determine if regressions would be by 
Fixed Effects or Random Effects21 . FE regressions also have the advantage of taking into 
account  unobserved heterogeneity and does  not  rest  on the assumption  of the  absence  of 
correlation between the variables and the error term. Upon regression, we justify our choice of 
GLS instead of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with a Wald statistics for heteroscedasticity. 
20 According to Maddala and Wu (1999), the alternative hypothesis (for the absence of a common unit) of Levin, 
Lin and Chu (LLC) test is too strong. Following Asongu (2011) we based our decisions on results of IPS test in  
case of conflict of interest.  
21 A priori, the Fixed Effect regression is plausible as cross sections are member states of a given continent that 
are not randomly selected. 
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4.2.3 Model formulation
Models (1) and (2) are based on the finance-led-growth nexus and are in line with 
recent finance-growth literature (Hassan et al., 2011). The later checks the former and “t” 
ranges from 1986 to 2009 for each cross section.   
+= 0γitGDPg +ithop )(Pr1γ +itT2γ +itInfl3γ +itGov4γ itε                                           (1)
For robustness check
 += 0γitGDPpcg +ithop )(Pr1γ +itT2γ +itInfl3γ +itGov4γ +itPopg5γ itε                (2)
Where;   Prop,  T,  Infl,  Gov,  Popg,  GDPpcg and  GDPg represent   Propositions,  Trade, 
Inflation,  Government  expenditure,  Population growth,  GDP per  capita  growth and GDP 
growth respectively. 
                 Above models are replicated   for each set of propositions under consideration
22
. 
For proposed parameters that fail to significantly explain the dependent variable, transmission 
mechanism  models  are  applied  to  verify  their  effects  on  growth  via  same-sector 
interactions(see table 6).
4.2.4 Transmission mechanisms 
+= 0γitGDPg [ ] +itvopuop )(Pr*)(Pr1γ +itT2γ +itInfl3γ +itGov4γ itε                                  (3)
22 Where issues related to multicolinearity and overparametization cannot be foreseen (from correlation analysis), 
we introduce as many proposed regressors as possible. That is, propositions 1, 2 and 3 or 5, 6 and 7 when 
possible. 
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Robustness tests 
+= 0γitGDPpcg [ ] +itvopuop )(Pr*)(Pr1γ +itT2γ +itInfl3γ +itGov4γ +itPopg5γ itε             (4)
Where;   Prop,  T,  Infl,  Gov,  Popg,  GDPpcg and  GDPg represent   Propositions,  Trade, 
Inflation,  Government  expenditure,  Population growth,  GDP per  capita  growth and GDP 
growth respectively. The later equation (4) checks the former (3) with “t” ranging from 1986 
to 2009. Transmission mechanisms are based on hypothesis 4, with the presumption that if  
Prop(u) or Prop(v) are not independent  significant determinants of growth and/or welfare, 
their  interaction  could  yield  higher  significant  results  than  the  sum of  their  independent 
effects.  
5. Empirical Analysis 
5.1 Correlation Analysis
We perform two types of correlation analyses. The first as presented in table 3 aims to 
investigate if suggested propositions are exogenous to M2. Results show but for Proposition 
6, all propositions are significant determinants of M2 and therefore could be paramount in the 
finance-growth nexus. Formal,  semi-formal  and informal  finances  contain  97%, 27% and 
76% of information in M2. The very high coefficient of correlation for formal finance reflects 
the existing consensus that formal finance is the main driver of the M2. But given the relative 
size of informal finance information in M2 (76%), its role in the economic development is 
deserving of examination. Proposition 4 shows that semi-formal and informal finance reflect 
74% of information in M2. By the same token propositions 5 and 6 represent 33% and 4% of 
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M2 variations. For propositions 7 and 8, there are 39% and 33% of negative associations with 
M2 variations respectively.    
The second in the appendix shapes our expectations on the linkages between growth 
and  propositions  on  the  one  hand;  and  on  the  other  hand,  enable  plausible  model 
specifications in a bid to avoid problems linked to multicolinearity and overparametization. 
Table 3: Correlation analyses between financial depth (M2) and Propositions 
Props Prop.1 Prop.2 Prop.3 Prop.4 Prop.5 Prop.6 Prop.7 Prop.8
C.Coef. 0.97*** 0.27*** 0.76*** 0.74*** 0.33*** 0.04 -0.39*** -0.33***
t-stats 63.71 4.12 17.21 15.98 5.15 0.62 -6.20 -5.15
C.Coef: Correlation coefficient. Props: propositions. t-stats: student statistics. *,**,***; significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
5.2 Empirical results
5.2.1 Results from Propositions 1 to 4
As shown in table 4, while the first main column of the table illustrates base-models 
from equation (1) in the finance-growth nexus, the second shows corresponding robustness 
checks of said models from equation (2) in the finance-welfare nexus. For instance “Model 1” 
is checked by “Model 1*” and so forth.  At first glance, regardless of estimated coefficient-
signs all propositions are independent significant determinants of growth and welfare. While 
liquid liabilities and the informal financial sector reflect a negative finance-le-growth nexus, 
the semi-formal financial sector accounts for the contrary. Semi-formal finance further weighs 
heavily in the determination of the estimated coefficient sign of Proposition 4(when its effect 
is combined with that of informal finance) . 
Our controls for inflation, trade, government-expenditure and population growth are 
significant with expected signs and consistent with recent empirical literature (Hassan et al., 
2011).  Due to issues of multicolinearity and overparametization (see appendix 1) we could 
not regress growth variables on all the propositions simultaneously. 
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Table 4: Regressions with propositions 1 to 4
Base Models: GDPg(l) Robustness Test Models: GDPpcg(l)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1* Model 2* Model 3* Model4*
Const. -0.53 -0.42 -1.32 -0.42 -0.16 -0.09 -0.87 -0.05
(-0.31) (-0.23) (-0.78) (-0.23) (-0.07) (-0.03) (-0.37) (-0.02)
M2(d) -86.9*** --- -110*** --- -84.5*** --- -107.5*** ---
(-7.39) (-6.80) (-7.32) (-6.79)
Prop.1(d) --- -111.2*** --- -112*** --- -108.7*** --- -110***
(-7.33) (-7.23) (-7.32) (-7.21)
Prop.2(d) 115.2** --- --- 18.21 110.8** --- --- 16.73
(2.62) (0.47) (2.58) (0.44)
Prop.3(l) --- -11.52* --- -11.43* --- -11.04* --- -10.95*
(-1.84) (-1.82) (-1.80) (-1.78)
Prop.4(d) --- --- 93.38*** --- --- 91.89***
(3.05) (3.07)
Infl.(l) -0.07*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.07** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09***
(-2.39) (-3.28) (-3.07) (-3.30) (-2.35) (-3.23) (-3.03) (-3.25)
Trade(l) 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10***
(3.22) (3.89) (3.77) (3.90) (2.99) (3.65) (3.53) (3.65)
Popg(l) --- --- --- --- -1.05** -1.04** -1.07** -1.05**
(-2.21) (-2.24) (-2.27) (-2.25)
Gov’t(d) -0.50*** -0.51*** -0.50*** -0.51*** -0.49*** -0.50*** -0.49*** -0.50***
(-4.25) (-4.41) (-4.26) (-4.41) (-4.24) (-4.40) (-4.26) (-4.41)
Hetero 178.6*** 157.08*** 157.74*** 147.21*** 183.1*** 157.8*** 159.8*** 148.6***
Adj. R² 0.33 0.36 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.39 0.37 0.38
Fisher 8.04*** 9.08*** 8.32*** 8.41*** 8.52*** 9.54*** 8.84*** 8.88***
(l): level. (d): first difference. *, **, ***:  denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Prop: propositions. GDPpcg: GDP per  
capita growth.  GDPg: GDP growth.  LL (M2): Liquid Liabilities  on GDP. Infl:  Inflation.  Popg:  Population growth.  Gov’t:  Government  
expenditure.  Hetero:  Wald  Chi-Square  statistics  for  heteroscedasticity.  Adj.  R²:  Adjusted  Coefficient  of  determination.  Fisher:  Fisher  
statistics.  Prop.1: formal financial sector development. Prop.2: semi-formal financial sector development. Prop.3: informal financial sector  
development. Prop.4: semi-formal and informal financial sectors development. 
5.2.2 Results from Propositions 5 to 8
Regressions on indicators of sector importance presented in table 5 below  have the 
same  structure  as  those  of  table  4  above.  Our  controls  for  inflation,  trade,  government-
expenditure and population growth are significant with expected signs and compatible with 
recent empirical literature (Hassan et al., 2011). While propositions 6 and 8 are significant 
with the right signs (as those of propositions 2 and 4 respectively in table 4), propositions 5 
and 7 respectively for formal and informal finance sector importance are insignificant with the 
right signs (as for propositions 1 and 3 respectively in table 4). Since propositions 5 and 7 are 
not independently significant in the finance-growth nexus, we are poised to further verify 
their validity by virtue of hypothesis 4(See Section 3.2.5).
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Table 5: Regressions with propositions 5 to 8
Initial Model: GDPg(l) Robustness test: GDPpcg(l)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1* Model 2* Model 3* Model4*
Const. -0.29 0.50 -0.84 0.50 -0.14 1.91 -0.46 1.91
(-0.17) (0.26) (-0.49) (0.26) (-0.06) (0.71) (-0.19) (0.71)
M2(d) -76.1*** --- -79.6*** --- -74.2*** --- -77.7*** ---
(-7.23) (-7.55) (-7.17) (-7.52)
Prop.5(d) --- -13.31 --- -8.21 --- -12.27 --- -8.88
(-0.58) (-0.66) (-0.55) (-0.73)
Prop.6(d) 39.97** --- --- 5.09 38.19** --- --- 3.38
(2.03) (0.22) (1.98) (0.15)
Prop.7(d) --- -5.09 --- --- --- -3.38 --- ---
(-0.22) (-0.15)
Prop.8(d) --- --- 30.4*** --- --- --- 30.1*** ---
(2.87) (2.90)
Infl.(l) -0.06** -0.07** -0.08*** -0.07** -0.06** -0.07* -0.08*** -0.07*
(-2.21) (-2.00) (-2.82) (-2.00) (-2.17) (-1.96) (-2.79) (-1.96)
Trade(l) 0.08*** 0.06** 0.09*** 0.06** 0.08*** 0.05* 0.09*** 0.05*
(3.00) (2.01) (3.47) (2.01) (2.82) (1.72) (3.24) (1.72)
Popg(l) --- --- --- --- -0.99** -1.36** -1.05** -1.36**
(-2.07) (-2.50) (-2.23) (-2.50)
Gov’t(d) -0.51*** -0.71*** -0.49*** -0.71*** -0.50*** -0.70*** -0.49*** -0.70***
(-4.26) (-5.36) (-4.22) (-5.36) (-4.23) (-5.42) (-4.21) (-5.42)
Hetero 242.6*** 597.5*** 215.8*** 597.5*** 244.0*** 532.3*** 218.3*** 532.3***
Adj. R² 0.32 0.11 0.33 0.11 0.35 0.16 0.37 0.16
Fisher 7.71*** 2.86*** 8.19*** 2.86*** 8.20*** 3.51*** 8.72*** 3.51***
(l): level. (d): first difference. *, **, ***:  denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Prop: propositions. GDPpcg: GDP per  
capita growth.  GDPg: GDP growth.  LL (M2): Liquid Liabilities  on GDP. Infl:  Inflation.  Popg:  Population growth.  Gov’t:  Government  
expenditure.  Hetero:  Wald  Chi-Square  statistics  for  heteroscedasticity.  Adj.  R²:  Adjusted  Coefficient  of  determination.  Fisher:  Fisher  
statistics.  Prop.5: formal financial sector development. Prop.6: semi-formal financial sector development. Prop.7: informal financial sector  
development. Prop.8: semi-formal and informal financial sectors development.  
5.2.3 Results from interaction of propositions
Table 6 below covers regressions for the validity of hypothesis 4. As in the last two 
tables, our controls for inflation,  trade, government-expenditure and population growth are 
significant with expected signs and consistent with recent empirical literature (Hassan et al., 
2011).  The  significance  of  interactions  of  propositions  1  and  5  on  the  one  hand,  and 
propositions 3 and 7 on the other indirectly validate propositions 5 and 7. This implies that 
though propositions 5 and 7 are not independent significant determinants of growth (table 5), 
their  interactions  with  propositions  1  and  3  are  favorable  to  the  finance-growth  nexus. 
Therefore with respect to our database, propositions 5 and 7 are valid if and only if there are 
simultaneous  improvements  in  proportions  of  GDP and shares  in  M2 for  the  formal  and 
informal financial sectors. Beyond this fact, our indirect validation of propositions 5 and 7 
comply with the premise of hypothesis 4. For instance the interaction of propositions 1 and 5 
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affect growth and welfare much higher than their independent effects combined. This also 
applies to semi-formal and informal sectors. 
Table 6: Regressions with interactions of propositions
Initial Model: GDPg(l) Robustness test: GDPpcg(l)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1* Model 2* Model 3* Model4*
Const. -0.55 -0.94 -1.06 -1.05 -0.45 -0.30 -0.73 -0.37
(-0.32) (-0.58) (-0.61) (-0.64) (-0.19) (-0.13) (-0.30) (-0.16)
LL(d) -79*** --- -87.4*** --- -77.1*** --- -85.5*** ---
(-7.36) (-6.55) (-7.31) (-6.54)
[Prop.1*Prop.5](d) --- -137.9*** --- -141.5*** --- -134.4*** --- -138.1***
(-8.05) (-8.15) (-8.02) (-8.12)
[Prop.2*Prop.6](d) 485.9** --- --- -230.86 471.7** --- --- -230.05
(2.32) (-1.19) (2.30) (-1.22)
[Prop.3*Prop.7](d) --- -267.9*** --- -267.9*** --- -257.7*** --- -257.6***
(-4.92) (-4.93) (-4.83) (-4.84)
[Prop.4*Prop8](d) --- --- 94.50* --- --- --- 93.84* ---
(1.87) (1.90)
Infl.(l) -0.06** -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.06** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.09***
(-2.23) (-2.95) (-2.67) (-3.02) (-2.19) (-2.91) (-2.64) (-2.99)
Trade(l) 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09***
(3.18) (3.71) (3.44) (3.77) (2.99) (3.44) (3.23) (3.50)
Popg(l) --- --- --- --- -0.97** -1.13** -1.04** -1.14**
(-2.04) (-2.49) (-2.17) (-2.52)
Gov’t(d) -0.51*** -0.51*** -0.50*** -0.50*** -0.50*** -0.51*** -0.49*** -0.50***
(-4.28) (-4.57) (-4.21) (-4.48) (-4.25) (-4.59) (-4.20) (-4.51)
Hetero 238.6*** 78.02*** 211.8*** 79.3*** 239.4*** 80.67*** 214.2*** 82.15***
Adj. R² 0.32 0.38 0.31 0.38 0.35 0.41 0.35 0.41
Fisher 7.86*** 9.94*** 7.63*** 9.36*** 8.36*** 10.37*** 8.16*** 9.80***
(l): level. (d): first difference. *, **, ***:  denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Prop: propositions. GDPpcg: GDP per  
capita growth.  GDPg: GDP growth.  LL (M2): Liquid Liabilities  on GDP. Infl:  Inflation.  Popg:  Population growth.  Gov’t:  Government  
expenditure.  Hetero:  Wald  Chi-Square  statistics  for  heteroscedasticity.  Adj.  R²:  Adjusted  Coefficient  of  determination.  Fisher:  Fisher  
statistics.  [Prop.1*Prop.5]:  formal  financial  sector  development.  [Prop.2*Prop.6]:  semi-formal  financial  sector  development.  
[Prop.3*Prop.7]: informal financial sector development. [Prop.4*Prop.8]: semi-formal and informal financial sectors development.
For tables 4, 5 and 6, the Fisher and Wald statistics for respectively the significance of 
overall  model  and  justification  of  the  use  of  GLS  are  significant  for  all  regressions. 
Explanatory  powers  of  estimated  parameters  expressed  by  the  adjusted  coefficient  of 
determination (Adj.R²) are also impressive.  
5.2.4 Retrospect to hypotheses  
Hypothesis  1:  “The  informal  financial  sector  (a  previously  missing  component  in  the  
definition of monetary base: M2) significantly contributes to economic growth”. 
We have verified the empirical validity of  propositions 3 and 7 resulting from this 
hypothesis.  While  Proposition  3 is  an independent  significant  determinant  in  the  finance-
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growth  nexus,  simultaneous  improvements  of  propositions  3  and  7  indirectly  validate 
Proposition 7 by virtue of hypothesis 4.
Hypothesis 2: “Disentangling different components of the existing measurement (financial  
system) into formal (banking sector) and semi-formal (other financial institutions) financial  
sector indicators could improve understanding of the finance-growth nexus”. 
We have equally verified this hypothesis. While in tables 4, 5 and 6, coefficients of 
M2 have been significantly negative, those corresponding to formal and semi-formal finance 
have  been  negative  and  positive  respectively.  This  suggests  formal  finance  is  the  more 
important determinant of M223. However disentangling the semi-formal finance sector yields a 
different significant sign (positive) in the finance-growth nexus. This implies had M2 been 
used as the sole financial indicator, its negative sign (geared by formal finance) would have 
over-shadowed the  positive  sign  of  semi-formal  finance  contained  there-in.  Consequently 
disentanglement has improved our understanding of the finance-growth nexus. 
Hypothesis 3: “Introducing measures of sector importance could ameliorate the capacity to  
understand how evolvements (improvements) of shares in different sectors of the financial  
system affect the finance-growth nexus”.   
But  for  the  semi-formal  financial  sector  in  which  a  great  part  of  information  in 
Proposition  2  in  reflected  in  Proposition  6(approximately  90%),  only  51%  and  23%  of 
information  in  propositions  1  and  3  are  present  in  propositions  5  and  7  respectively(see 
correlation analysis in appendix). This suggests that sector importance finance indicators are 
not the same as GDP ratio indicators (: they are complements to GDP ratio measures). Thus, 
though the finance-led-growth effects  of similar  sectors in the two categories of indicator 
(GDP or M2 ratios)  have the same sign and significance,  our data  structure  by virtue  of 
23 Its sign (that of formal finance) affects the sign of the M2 coefficient more significantly. 
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correlation analysis shows same sector M2 ratios and sector GDP ratios are not the same(: do 
not contain the same information ).  Vertically comparing coefficients from regressions in 
tables 4,  5 and 6, it  could be deduced that the finance growth-nexus is  more affected by 
proportion-of-GDP financial-sector ratios than shares-of-M2 ratios(: further evidence that the 
two sets of indicators contain information with different variations).
Hypothesis 4: “For formal finance, simultaneous improvement in shares of GDP (Prop.1)  
and Monetary Base (Prop.5) should have a higher impact on Growth (than their combined  
independent  effects).  By the same token,  this  applies  to  semi-formal finance  (Prop.2  and  
Prop.6) and informal finance (Prop.3 and Prop.7)”.
We have shown that, though sector GDP ratios or sector M2 ratios are independent 
significant determinants of growth, simultaneous improvements in sector shares of GDP and 
M2 will yield a greater effect on growth than their combined independent effects. Thus policy 
oriented towards simultaneously increase of shares in both categories of ratios should yield 
higher growth-effects. 
6. Conclusion
Financial development indicators are often applied to countries/regions without taking 
into account  specific  financial  development realities.  Financial  depth in the perspective of 
monetary base is not equal to liquid liabilities in every development context.  This paper has 
introduced complementary indicators  to  the existing  Financial  Development  and Structure 
Database (FDSD). 
We have empirical tested four hypotheses and withheld the following: (1) the informal 
financial  sector  (a previously missing component  in  the definition  of the monetary)  base) 
significantly contributes to economic growth; (2) disentangling different components of the 
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existing measurement (financial system) into formal (banking sector) and semi-formal (other 
financial  institutions)  financial  sector  indicators   improves  understanding  of  the  finance-
growth nexus; (3) introducing measures of sector importance could ameliorate the capacity to 
understand how evolvements (improvements) of shares in different sectors of the financial 
system affect the finance-growth nexus; (4) though sector GDP ratios or sector M2 ratios are 
independent significant determinants of growth, simultaneous improvements in sector shares 
of GDP and M2 will yield a greater effect on growth than their combined independent effects.
The  work  unites  two  streams  of  research.  It  contributes  at  the  same  time  to  the 
macroeconomic literature on measuring financial development and responds to the growing 
field  of  economic  development  by  means  of  informal  financial  sector  promotion  and 
microfinance. The paper suggests a practicable way to disentangle the effects of the various 
financial sectors on economic developments.
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Appendices
Appendix 1 : Correlation analysis
LL Prop1 Prop2 Prop3 Prop4 Prop5 Prop6 Prop7 Prop8 Infl. Trade GDPg GDPpc Popg Gov
1.00 0.97 0.27 0.76 0.74 0.33 0.04 -0.39 -0.33 -0.21 0.29 -0.04 0.08 -0.57 0.04 LL
1.00 0.12 0.44 0.42 0.51 -0.08 -0.47 -0.51 -0.23 0.38 -0.02 0.11 -0.63 0.05 Prop1
1.00 0.13 0.53 -0.40 0.90 -0.34 0.40 0.16 -0.02 -0.08 -0.09 0.04 0.03 Prop2
1.00 0.90 -0.12 -0.12 0.23 0.12 -0.27 -0.00 -0.16 -0.10 -0.23 0.03 Prop3
1.00 -0.32 0.41 -0.01 0.32 -0.16 -0.01 -0.17 -0.13 -0.17 0.04 Prop4
1.00 -0.47 -0.65 -1.00 -0.20 0.54 0.00 0.09 -0.45 -0.02 Prop5
1.00 -0.35 0.47 0.30 -0.05 -0.04 -0.08 0.16 0.00 Prop6
1.00 0.65 -0.04 -0.53 0.03 -0.02 0.33 0.02 Prop7
1.00 0.20 -0.54 -0.00 -0.09 0.45 0.02 Prop8
1.00 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.16 0.01 Infl.
1.00 -0.06 0.02 -0.43 -0.01 Trade
1.00 0.98 -0.04 -0.10 GDPg
1.00 -0.23 -0.08 GDPpc
1.00 -0.05 Popg
1.00 Gov
Infl. :Inflation. Popg :Population growth. Gov : Government expenditure. GDPg:GDP growth; GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth; LL: Liquid Liabilities 
on GDP; Prop.1:Proposition 1; Prop.2: Proposition 2; Prop.3:Proposition 3; Prop.4:Proposition 4; Prop.5:Proposition 5 ; Prop.6 : Proposition 6 ; 
Prop.7 :Proposition 7 ; Prop.8 ; Proposition 8
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